### $\bullet$  CS6222 Cryptography  $\bullet$

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# 1 A Universal One-Way Function

"Cryptographers Seldom Sleep Well"

—— Silvio Micali, personal communication to Joe Kilian, 1988

In the last lecture, we constructed a one-way function (OWF) assuming that factoring is hard. Unfortunately, we do not know how to prove factoring is hard, and Shor's algorithm [\[Wik\]](#page-2-0) seems to be evidence that factoring might be easy in the future. So, cryptographers want to construct a OWF based on weaker assumptions. Fortunately, if we assume that a valid OWF exists, it is possible for us to construct a OWF solely based on that assumption. That is the universal OWF.

### 1.1 Universal OWF Construction

The idea of constructing a universal one-way function (OWF) is to construct a function that can computes any efficiently computable function. Since any OWF must be easy to compute with a constant size Turing machine, we can use random strings to sample such a Turing machine. Even though we may not know the exact machine, we can still achieve this with almost constant probability.

Theorem 1. If there exists a OWF, then the following polynomial-time computable function funiversal is a weak OWF.

*Proof.* We will construct the function  $f_{universal}$  and show that it is a weak OWF. As shown in the last lecture, weak OWFs can be converted to strong OWFs.

**Construction of**  $f_{universal}$ . For an input y, where the length of the input  $|y| = n$ .

- 1. Represent y as  $M|x$ , where y is interpreted as a pair  $(M, x)$  consisting of a Turing machine M and a bitstring x, with  $|M| = \log n$  and  $|x| = n - \log n$ ;
- 2. Run M on x for  $T = n^2$  steps;
- 3. If M halts within T steps, output  $(M, M(x))$ . Otherwise, output ⊥.

Now, assume that g is a one-way function  $(WF)$ , though we do not know the exact function. There exists a Turing machine  $M_q$  that computes g in polynomial time. Let  $|M_q|$  be the description length of  $M_q$ , and note that we can pad the description of any Turing machine with a special  $\perp$  symbol to arbitrary length. For sufficiently large n, the first random  $\log n$  bits of y will correspond to  $M_g$ with probability  $1/n$ . Hence, the output of  $f_{universal}(y)$  is exactly  $g(x)$ .

We now claim that  $f_{universal}$  is a weak OWF. For simplicity, we omit the subscript of the universal OWF in the following part of the proof. Suppose  $f$  is not a weak OWF. Then, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time (NUPPT) algorithm  $A$  such that, for every polynomial q and infinitely many  $n$ ,

$$
\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}[\mathcal{A}(1^n, f(y)) \in f^{-1}(f(y))] \ge 1 - 1/q(n).
$$

In particular, we can take  $q(n) = n^2$ . For  $n \geq 2^{|M_g|}$  and random n-bit input  $y = M||x$ , the probability of that M represents  $M_g$  is  $\frac{1}{2^{\log n}} = \frac{1}{n}$  $\frac{1}{n}$ . Let  $x' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-\log n}, z' = g(x')$  and  $M' \leftarrow$  $\{0,1\}^{\log n}$ . Now we construct an NUPPT  $\beta$  to invert g as follows:

- 1. Run  $\mathcal{A}(1^n, z')$  to output y;
- 2. Interpret y as  $(M, x)$ ;
- 3. If  $z' = g(x)$ , output x; otherwise output  $\perp$ .

Notice that

$$
\frac{1}{n^2} \ge \Pr_{\substack{x' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-\log n} \\ M' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n\ge n}}} [\mathcal{A}(1^n, f(M'||x')) \notin f^{-1}(f(M'||x'))]
$$
\n
$$
\ge \Pr_{\substack{x' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-\log n} \\ M' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n\ge n}}} [\mathcal{A}(1^n, f(M'||x')) \notin f^{-1}(f(M'||x')) | M' = M_g] \Pr_{\substack{M' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\log n} \\ M' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n\ge n}}} [M' = M_g]
$$
\n
$$
= \Pr_{x' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-\log n}} [\mathcal{A}(1^n, f(M_g||x')) \notin f^{-1}(f(M_g||x'))] \Pr_{M' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\log n}} [M' = M_g]
$$
\n
$$
= \Pr_{x' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-\log n}} [\mathcal{A}(1^n, f(M_g||x')) \notin f^{-1}(f(M_g||x'))] \frac{1}{n}.
$$

Then we have

$$
\Pr_{x' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-\log n}}[\mathcal{B}(1^n, g(x')) \notin g^{-1}(g(x'))] = \Pr_{x' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-\log n}}[\mathcal{A}(1^n, f(M_g||x')) \notin f^{-1}(f(M_g||x'))] \le n \cdot \frac{1}{n^2} = \frac{1}{n}
$$

which implies that  $g$  is not a OWF, resulting in a contradiction.

$$
\Box
$$

We omitted an explanation in the previous proof for why we set the running time T as  $n^2$ . The following lemma clarifies that there exists an OWF computable in  $O(n^2)$  time, assuming the existence of an OWF.

**Lemma 2.** If there exists a OWF g computable in time  $n^c$ , then there exists then there is some OWF g' computable in time  $O(n^2)$ .

*Proof.* For any input  $x \in \{0,1\}^{n^c}$ , interpret  $x = x_1||x_2$  s.t.  $|x_1| = n^c - n$ , and then define  $g'(x) = g'(x_1||x_2) := x_1||g(x_2)$ . Let  $m = n^c$  be the input size of g'. It is easy to see that g' is computable in  $O(m^2)$  time, and it follows by standard reduction that g' is hard to invert if g is a OWF.  $\Box$ 

Although this construction is theoretically sound, it is highly inefficient in practice. For instance, suppose there exists a one-way function that can be computed by a Turing machine with a description length of 1000 bits. To ensure the universal OWF is hard to invert, we would need the input size n such that  $\log n \ge 1000$ . This implies that the universal OWF would only be secure for inputs of size  $n = |x| \geq 2^{1000}$ , which is impractically large.

# <span id="page-2-1"></span>2 From OWF to PRG

Next, we aim to demonstrate that a PRG can be constructed from OWF. We first recap and compare the properties of PRGs and OWFs.

PRG: efficient, expanding, pseudorandom.

OWF: efficient, hard to invert.

### Differences between OWF and PRG:

- Output of OWF can be shorter or longer, but PRG must be expanded.
- OWF just needs to be hard to invert, doesn't need to be pseudorandom.

### Properties of OWF:

- The output of an OWF, when given a uniformly random input, must exhibit sufficient randomness. (Otherwise, one could guess randomly and have a reasonable probability of finding the preimage.)
- It must be difficult to predict the input x from  $f(x)$ , even if the OWF f is a one-to-one function, meaning x is uniquely determined by  $f(x)$ . The OWF introduces additional pseudorandomness.

## References

<span id="page-2-0"></span>[Wik] Wikipedia. Shor's algorithm.